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Abstract
We analyze a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multire-
gional transboundary pollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution
stock) is defined by a two dimensional parabolic partial differential equation. The control
variables (emissions) are spatially distributed variables. The model allows for a, possibly
large, number of agents with predetermined geographical relationships. For a special func-
tional form previously used in the literature of transboundary pollution dynamic games
we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. We show that at the equilib-
rium both the level and the location of emissions of each region depend on the particular
geographical relationship among agents. We prove that, even in a simplified model, the
geographical considerations can modify the players’ optimal strategies and therefore, the
spatial aspects of the model should not be overlooked.
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature on dynamic models settled for the analysis of different economic and
environmental problems takes into account the temporal aspect but disregards the spatial
aspect. The addition of the spatial dimension although enriches the model and consequently
its prescriptions comes at the cost of making the analysis much more difficult. Over the last
decade the spatial dimension has been introduced in different economic and environmental
contexts, such as, for example, allocation of economic activity or technological diffusion
(Brito (2004), Camacho et al. (2008), Brock & Xepapadeas (2008a), Boucekkine et al.
(2009, 2013a, 2013b, 2019a), Desmet & Rossi-Hansberg (2010), Brock et al. (2014a) and
Fabbri (2016)) or environmental and climate problems (Brock & Xepapadeas (2008b, 2010),
Brock et al. (2014b), Camacho & Pe´rez-Barahona (2015), Xepapadeas (2010), Anita et al.
(2013, 2015), Desmet & Rossi-Hansberg (2015), La Torre et al. (2015), Augeraud-Ve´ron
et al. (2017, 2019a, 2019b), Boucekkine et al. (2019b), and De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n
(2019a, 2019b)). Except De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, 2019b) all the previously
cited papers study finite or infinite time horizon optimal control problems extended to
infinite dimensional state space. All these papers analyze problems where there is only one
decision-maker.
One of the main differences between De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, 2019b) and
the other contributions to this literature is the introduction of strategic interactions be-
tween the decision-makers. The addition of the strategic behavior of the agents implies a
methodological change, moving from an optimal control problem to a dynamic game. More
specifically, De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, 2019b) study an intertemporal transbound-
ary pollution dynamic game where there is a continuum of spatial sites and the pollution
stock diffuses over these sites. In both papers the original J-player (region or country)
model is formulated in continuous space and continuous time with two spatial dimensions
and one temporal dimension, the spatio-temporal evolution of the stock of a pollutant is
described by a diffusion partial differential equation (PDE) and general boundary condi-
tions are assumed. In De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a) each player decides the emission
level so as to maximize the present value of benefits net of environmental damages due to
the concentration of a pollutant over his spatial domain, taking into account the PDE that
describes the spatio-temporal evolution of the stock of a pollutant. In De Frutos & Mart´ın-
Herra´n (2019b) in addition to choosing the level of emissions, each player also decides the
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investment in clean technology, taking into account the temporal evolution of the stock of
clean technology and that the greater this stock the lower the emission-output ratio.
Both papers follow the same spatial discretization approach to characterize the equi-
librium emission strategies in a multiregional setting with spatial effects. In the space-
discretized model there are J state variables, the average pollution in each one of the J
regions or countries, and the temporal dynamics of these variables is described by a system of
J ordinary differential equations. Graß & Uecker (2017) uses a similar spatial discretization
approach to analyze spatially distributed optimal control problems. In De Frutos & Mart´ın-
Herra´n (2019a) the feedback Nash equilibrium of the two-player space-discretized model is
analytically characterized, while for more than two players, the model is numerically solved
by adapting a numerical algorithm presented in De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2015). The
linear-quadratic specification of the model is inspired in the literature of transboundary
pollution dynamic games (Jørgensen et al. (2010) surveyed this literature), specifically in
the seminal papers by Dockner & Long (1993) and Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1992).
The numerical examples show that once the spatial dimension and the strategic behavior
of the decision-makers are introduced the environmental policies greatly differ from those
characterized ignoring either the spatial dimension or the strategic interactions among the
agents. In De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019b) particular functional forms borrowed from
Jørgensen & Zaccour (2001) are considered in such a way that the dynamic game belongs to
the class of linear-state differential games. For this formulation the space-discretized model
is exactly solved and is proved to be a clear generalization of the model which ignores the
spatial transport phenomena. The equilibrium environmental policy of the spatial model
coincides with the equilibrium policy of the non-spatial model when the diffusion parameter,
that describes how pollution diffuses among regions, tends to infinity.
In the present paper we revisit the study of the equilibrium emission strategies in a
multiregional dynamic game in a spatial context. The main objective of the paper is
to characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium emission strategies of the original J-player
(region or country) model formulated in continuous space and continuous time. We depart
from the spatial discretization approach presented in De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a,
2019b) and for a linear-state specification inspired in Jørgensen & Zaccour (2001) and De
Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019b) we explicitly solve a functional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
system in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space. Thanks to the linear-state framework,
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guessing an affine form of the players’ value functions we can explicitly compute these
functions and as a consequence also the feedback Nash equilibrium emission strategies. The
resolution method involves solving several elliptical problems, one for each player. Although
the equilibrium strategies are constant in time as a direct consequence of the linear-state
structure of the dynamic game, interestingly, these strategies are not constant in space.
Solving the original model formulation enables to strategically determine the average total
emission in each region (as was the case in the space-discretized formulation of the model in
De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, 2019b)), but also to characterize the particular point in
the space where each region is emitting pollutants. Using the new approach proposed in this
paper we can analyze the optimal intraregional distribution of emissions of the pollutant,
a question that has been previously neglected. Furthermore, the new approach allows the
study not only of the diffusive effect, but also the case where advection is important and
particles are transported due to some external convective field, as for example, wind or
water flow.
Our analytical results show that the geographical aspects are essential ingredients when
determining the equilibrium emission strategies. Through several examples with different
geographical configurations we show that the type and behavior of the neighbors of one
region have an influence in its own equilibrium environmental policies, not only by deter-
mining the optimal amount of emissions but also establishing the optimal spatial location.
The results corroborate those obtained in the analysis of the space-discretized model which
allows us to conclude that this simplified model correctly captures the spatial essence of
the setting. However, the original model analyzed in the present paper is richer which in
turn allows us to have an accurate view of how the spatial ingredients affect the equilibrium
emission strategies and hence the pollution stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the multiregional trans-
boundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls and introduces some
technical hypotheses and definitions. Section 3 analytically studies the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman system of equations and derives the feedback Nash equilibrium of the differential
game. Section 4 presents some examples to highlight the properties of the Nash equilibria.
The paper finishes with some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
Let us denote by Ω a bounded planar domain endowed with a partition Ωj , j = 1, . . . , J ,
such that
Ω =
J⋃
j=1
Ωj , Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅, i 6= j.
where Ω is the closure of Ω. We denote by ∂ij the common boundary between subdomains
Ωi and Ωj , that is ∂ij := ∂Ωi ∩ ∂Ωj = Ωi ∩ Ωj , i 6= j.
The model is a J-player differential game in which the control variable of player i is the
pollutant emissions in region Ωi. The game is played non-cooperatively. In what follows
we identify player i with the region Ωi and use the word country to distinguish Ωi from the
whole region Ω. We assume that each of the countries, Ωi, i = 1, . . . , J , can exclusively emit
pollution in its own territory. The pollutant emissions in Ωi are represented by a function
ui : Ωi × [0,+∞)→ R+, i = 1, . . . , J .
The objective of player i, i = 1, . . . , J , is to maximize the following functional with
respect to ui,
Ji(u1, . . . , uJ , P0) =
∫ +∞
0
∫
Ωi
e−ρt
(
log(ui)− ϕiP
)
dx dt (1)
subject to
∂P
∂t
= ∇ · (k∇P ) + b · ∇P − cP + F (u1, . . . , uJ), x ∈ Ω,
P (x, 0) = P0(x), x ∈ Ω,
αP (x, t) + k∇P · n = αPb(x, t), x ∈ ∂Ω.
(2)
Here P denotes the state variable (pollution stock), F is assumed to be a real smooth
function of its arguments, P0 and Pb are known functions representing respectively, the
initial distribution of pollution and the external pollution that enters into Ω through its
boundary. In what follow we assume without loss of generality that function Pb is identically
zero. The diffusion coefficient k(x) is assumed to be a smooth function of the spatial
variables satisfying k1 ≤ k(x) ≤ k2 for some positive constants k1 and k2. The coefficient
c(x) represents the natural decay of pollution and it is supposed to be a non-negative
smooth function. Function b(x) represents an external convective field. We assume that
b(x) is smooth and divergence free ∇ · b = 0. Finally, α is a positive real number and mi
denotes the area of Ωi.
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In this paper, we assume that F (u1, . . . , uJ) =
∑J
j=1 uj1Ωj where 1Ωj is the character-
istic function of the set Ωj , j = 1, . . . , J . We are implicitly considering that function ui can
be arbitrarily extended outside of the domain Ωi.
Let us consider X = L2(Ω) the Hilbert space of square integrable functions defined over
domain Ω. As usual we identify X with its dual X∗. Here and in the rest of the paper, we
denote by Hs(Ω) the Sobolev space of functions with s derivatives, in the distributional
sense, in L2(Ω).
We define the set Ui of admissible controls for player i, i = 1, . . . , J , as the set of
functions ui defined in Ωi × R+ → R+. Although it is not essential here, we also assume
that functions ui ∈ Ui are bounded for almost all x ∈ Ω and t ≥ 0.
The hypotheses above guarantee that given an initial condition P0 ∈ X, the state equa-
tion (2) has a unique weak solution for each choice of the controls ui ∈ Ui, i = 1, . . . , J , see
Barbu (1993), Li & Yong (1995), Tro¨ltzsch (2009).
With this model we adopt the simplest version of the economic and environmental model
that still presents two important features allowing us to answer our main research question.
First, the strategic behaviour of the players, emissions by one player affects the environment
of all; and second, the spatial aspect that allows us to show that at the equilibrium both
the level and the location of emissions of each region depend on the particular geographical
relationship among agents.
We are interested in stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) of the game.
Then, we look for controls of the form ui(x, t) = Λi(P (x, t)), i = 1, . . . , J . Here the
strategies Λi are functionals Λi : X→ Ui such that the controlled dynamics
∂P
∂t
= ∇ · (k∇P ) + b · ∇P − cP +
J∑
j=1
Λj(P )1Ωj , x ∈ Ω,
P (x, τ) = Pτ (x), x ∈ Ω,
αP (x, t) + k∇P · n = αPb(x, t), x ∈ ∂Ω,
(3)
has a unique solution defined in [τ,∞) for every τ ≥ 0 and Pτ ∈ X.
Definition 1. A vector Λ∗ = [Λ∗1, . . . ,Λ∗J ] of admissible strategies is a Markov Perfect
Nash Equilibrium if Ji(u
∗, P0) ≥ Ji([ui,u∗−i], P0), for all ui = Λi(P ) with Λi an admissible
strategy, i = 1, . . . , J . Here, u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u∗J ], u
∗
j = Λ
∗
j (P
∗) and P ∗ is the solution of (3)
with Λi = Λ
∗
i , i = 1, . . . , J . We use [ui,u
∗
−i] to denote [u
∗
1, . . . , ui, . . . , u
∗
J ].
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Given a stationary MPNE Λ∗ = [Λ∗1, . . . ,Λ∗J ], Vi(P ) = Ji(u
∗, P ) is called the value
function of Player i.
The objective of the next section is to characterize the MPNE of the differential game
(1)-(2) through the study of the value function.
3 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
For simplicity in the exposition we assume in this section that b · n = 0 in ∂Ω. We define
the linear operator A : D(A)→ X by
AP = ∇ · (k∇P ) + b · ∇P − cP, ∀P ∈ X,
where D(A) = {P ∈ H2(Ω)|αP (x)+k∇P ·n = 0}, is the domain of A. The linear operator
A is continuous fromD(A) in X and is the infinitesimal generator of a contraction semigroup
eAt in X, see Li & Yong (1995). In what follows ∇W (P ) denotes the Fre´chet derivative of
a functional W and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product in X.
The following proposition is a consequence of Proposition 1.2 (Ch. 6, p.225) in Li &
Yong (1995), see also Bas¸ar & Olsder (1999), Haurie et al. (2012).
Proposition 1. Let Λ∗ = [Λ∗1, . . . ,Λ∗J ] be a MPNE. Let us assume that V
i(P ) is of class
C1(X), i = 1, . . . , J . The value functions V i, i = 1, . . . , J satisfy the functional Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman system
ρV i(P ) = sup
ui
{
Gi(P, ui) +
〈
AP + ui1Ωi +
∑
j 6=i
Λ∗j (P )1Ωj ,∇V i(P )
〉}
, i = 1, . . . , J, (4)
where
Gi(P, ui) =
∫
Ωi
(
log(ui)− ϕiP
)
dx.
Furthermore, Λ∗i (P ), i = 1, . . . , J , is a maximizer of the right hand side of (4).
The regularity hypothesis in Proposition 1 is very demanding. It is well known that even
in the finite dimensional case Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations can fail to have enough
regularity and one has to resort to weaker concepts as viscosity solutions, see, for example,
Barbu (1993), Cannarsa & Da Prato (1990), Li & Yon (1995). However, Proposition 1 is
enough for the model we study in this paper.
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In this paper, for simplicity, we use the strong optimality concept, Dockner et al. (2000),
so that transversality conditions of the form
lim
t7→∞ e
−ρtVi(P ∗(x, t)) = 0, i = 1, . . . , J. (5)
are necessary. The equilibrium we are going to compute explicitly leads to controlled dy-
namics that possess a (unique) stable stationary state, so that the transversality conditions
will be automatically satisfied.
We remark that, in general, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman systems of the form (4) with
boundary conditions as (5) have multiple solutions, see De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2018),
which correspond with possible multiple MPNE. Because the differential game fits the
linear-state class, we concentrate in the rest of the paper on value functions that are affine
in the state variable. More precisely, we look for affine value functions of the form
V i(P ) = wi +
∫
Ω
vi(x)P (x) dx, (6)
for some unknowns wi ∈ R and vi ∈ X.
We observe that the Fre´chet derivative of the affine functional V i(P ) in (6) is the linear
operator defined by 〈∇V i(P ), h〉 = ∫
Ω
vi(x)h(x) dx, h ∈ X. (7)
Using (7) and integrating by parts we have〈∇V i(P ),AP〉 = ∫
Ω
viAPdx =
∫
Ω
A∗viPdx, (8)
where A∗ denotes the adjoint of A defined for vi ∈ D(A∗) = D(A) by
A∗vi = ∇ · (k∇vi)− b · ∇vi − cvi.
Using again (7) we have〈∇V i(P ), uj1Ωj〉 = ∫
Ω
viuj1Ωjdx, j = 1, . . . , J. (9)
Finally, the derivatives with respect to ui of the functionals Gi(P, ui) and
F i(ui) :=
∫
Ω
viui1Ωidx
are given by 〈∇uiGi(P, ui), h〉 = ∫
Ω
1
ui
h1Ωidx, h ∈ X, (10)〈∇uiF i(ui), h〉 = ∫
Ω
vih1Ωidx, h ∈ X. (11)
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We can write now the first-order condition for the maximization of the right hand side
in (4) using (7)-(11). We have∫
Ω
1
ui
h1Ωidx+
∫
Ω
vih1Ωidx = 0, ∀h ∈ X = L2(Ω). (12)
So that
ui = − 1
vi
1Ωi , i = 1, . . . J. (13)
Substituting the guess (6) in the HJB equation (4) and using the previous results we
have
ρwi + ρ
∫
Ω
viP dx =∫
Ω
(
log
1
vi
− ϕiP
)
1Ωidx+
∫
Ω
A∗viPdx−
∫
Ω
J∑
j=1
vi
vj
1Ωjdx.
(14)
From (14) it is clear that function vi satisfies
A∗vi = ρvi + ϕi1Ωi , i = 1 . . . , J. (15)
The scalar wi can be computed from
wi =
1
ρ
∫
Ω
log
1
vi
1Ωidx−
1
ρ
∫
Ω
J∑
j=1
vi
vj
1Ωjdx. (16)
Summarizing we have proved the following proposition
Proposition 2. There exists a stationary Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the differ-
ential game (1)- (2), such that the value function of player i has the form (6) where vi is
the unique solution of the elliptic problem
∇ · (k∇vi)− b · ∇vi − cvi − ρvi = ϕi1Ωi , in Ω
αvi + k∇vi · n = 0, on ∂Ω
(17)
and wi ∈ R is given by (16). The strategy of player i, ui = ϕi(P ) is positive and can be
computed by (13).
Furthermore, the stationary steady state of the pollution stock is given by the solution
of the elliptic problem
∇ · (k∇P ) + b · ∇P − cP +
J∑
j=1
uj1Ωj = 0, in Ω
αP + k∇P · n = 0, on ∂Ω.
(18)
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4 Numerical examples
In this section we present some examples in order to illustrate the effects of the spatial
configurations on the strategic behaviour of the agents. We remark that even with this
simple formulation of the problem it is evident that on the one hand, the model is able
to capture the differences that can be expected in the equilibrium policies. On the other
hand, the examples show that, as expected, the optimal location of emissions as well as its
size depend on the geographical position among the players.
We fixed the following values of the parameters: c = 0.5, ϕi = 1, ρ = 0.01, k = 1. Also
and without any loss of generality we choose Pb = 0. We remark that with this choice of
the parameters all the agents are symmetric except, perhaps, for the geographic relative
position. It should be apparent that the qualitative results do not depend on the particular
values chosen if we restrict our study to constant coefficients (isotropic diffusion). The case
of anisotropic diffusion, although interesting, is out of the scope of this paper.
Example 1. In this example we consider a rectangular region Ω subdivided in two identical
countries Ωi, i = 1, 2. More explicitly Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2 with Ω1 = [0, 0.5] × [0, 1] and Ω2 =
[0.5, 1] × [0, 1], respectively. We consider that region Ω is completely isolated from the
exterior, that is we put α = 0 in (2). We consider b = 0 (no convection) in this example.
The left picture in Figure 1 represents the emissions and the right picture represents the
stock of pollution at steady state. We fix this convention for the rest of examples in this
paper. We can observe that both countries behave in a symmetric manner as corresponds
to the completely symmetric geometry. On the one hand, each country chooses the emission
rate symmetrically with respect to the horizontal axis. On the other hand, both countries
emit more near the common boundary between Ω1 and Ω2. The emission rate decreases as
the distance from the common boundary increases. Because both regions are isolated from
outside both strategically decide to reduce as much as possible the emission rates at the
points in space where the exchange of pollution stock with their neighbours is more difficult.
The steady-state levels of the pollution stocks compare as the equilibrium emission rates.
Example 2. The geometry of this example is identical to the previous one with the differ-
ence that we consider that α = 1 in the part of the boundary defined by x = 0 and x = 1
10
Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 1: Two isolated symmetric countries.
and α = 0 on the lines defined by y = 0 and y = 1. This choice models a situation in which
the region is isolated from the outside in the top and bottom boundaries defined by y = 0
and y = 1, and can freely exchange pollution with the clean (Pb = 0) exterior through the
vertical lines x = 0 and x = 1. The behaviour is similar to the previous example except for
the effect of the open vertical boundaries. The two countries are able to detect that they
can get rid of part of the pollution stock at no cost and, consequently, they increase the
emission near this open boundary, see Figure 2. Note that the size of the emissions is larger
than in Example 1 whereas the stock of pollution is smaller, clearly reflecting the effect of
the open boundaries.
Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 2: Two symmetric countries. Open boundaries
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Example 3. In this example we consider again a rectangular region Ω = [0, 2] × [0, 1],
but this time subdivided in four identical countries with different relative positions. More
explicitly the countries are defined by Ω1 = [0, 0.5] × [0, 1], Ω2 = [0.5, 1] × [0, 1], Ω3 =
[1, 2]× [0, 0.5] and Ω4 = [1, 2]× [0.5, 1]. As in the two previous examples Ω is isolated from
the exterior (α = 0 in (2)) and there is no convection (b = 0). We can observe in Figure 3
that the smaller the number of neighbouring countries, the lower the equilibrium emissions
level. This result is consistent with the two previous examples: Each country knows that
its own emissions are being diffused away so they increase the emissions if they have a
larger number of neighbours. This comes from the fact that in this model, the positive
effect of the emissions is not shared with other countries, whereas the negative effect of
the concentration of pollution is shared through the diffusive state equations. We can also
observe the effect of the relative position on the equilibrium strategies. The emissions in Ω3
and Ω4, which are completely symmetric, are much higher than expected in the proximity
of Ω2, because both countries recognize the increase of emissions in Ω2. On the contrary,
the emissions along the common boundary of Ω3 and Ω34 decrease as the distance to Ω2
increases. As in Example 1, the steady-state levels of the pollution stocks compare as the
equilibrium emission rates.
Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 3: Four countries. Different number of neighbours
Example 4. Next three examples models a situation in which six, otherwise identical
countries, are consecutively positioned along a channel of, say, groundwater forming a
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(double) L-shaped geometry. The geometry is defined by Ω1 = [0, 0.5] × [0, 0.5], Ω2 =
[0.5, 1] × [0, 0.5], Ω3 = [0.5, 1] × [0.5, 1], Ω4 = [0.5, 1] × [1, 1.5], Ω5 = [0.5, 1] × [1.5, 2] and
Ω6 = [1, 1.5] × [1.5, 2]. In this example region Ω =
⋃6
j=1 Ωj is isolated from the exterior
(α = 0 in (2)) and there is no convection (b = 0).
Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 4: Six countries in a isolated L-shaped domain.
In Figure 4 we observe again the dependence of each country emissions on the number
of its neighbours. In this picture we can observe a new feature not presented in the previous
examples: The dependence on the distance through from the boundary. The emissions in
countries Ω3 and Ω4 are the highest among the six countries because their neighbours Ω2
and Ω5 have themselves another farther neighbour and the diffusion can spread the stock
of pollution to a larger and more distant area. We shall use this example to compare with
the next and last two examples.
Example 5. The geometry of this example is the same as in Example 4 except that now
country Ω1 has an open boundary defined by the line x = 0. That is, α = 0 in ∂Ω except
in ∂Ω ∩ {x = 0} where α = 1. Figure 5 shows how a small change in the geographical
setting can cause a dramatic change in the equilibrium emissions which is reflected in the
change of the steady state of the stock of pollution. Country Ω1 that has the open boundary
takes advantage of this fact emitting at the highest level (see left picture in Figure 5). The
emissions of the rest of the countries are lower the longer the distance to the open boundary.
However, the stock of pollution follows the opposite pattern: the larger the distance to the
open boundary, the greater the steady-state stock of pollution.
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Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 5: Six countries in an L-shaped domain. Open boundary
It is also interesting to compare the size of emissions in Examples 4 and 5. The following
facts are apparent from Figure 4 and Figure 5. First, the emissions are larger in average if
Ω has some part of the boundary open to exchange pollution with the exterior. Of course
for this to be true, we have to consider that the exterior is clean (Pb = 0). However, the size
of the steady-state stock of pollution is about the same size in Figure 4 (right picture) and
Figure 5 (right picture). Then although the effect of the open boundary is positive for the
overall region Ω, because higher emissions with the same stock of pollution lead to higher
welfare, this is not the case if we individually analyze each one of the Ωi. Clearly, Ω6 suffers
the consequences of the relocation of the stock of pollution which can give, depending on
the parameters value, a lower welfare for this country.
Example 6. In the last example we consider again the L-shaped domain of Example 5.
However, this time we consider a convective flow given by
b(x) =

(4, 0), x ∈ Ω1 ∪ Ω6 ∪
(
Ω2 ∩ {(x, y), y < x− 1}
) ∪ (Ω5 ∩ {(x, y), y ≥ 5/2− x})
(0, 4), x ∈ Ω3 ∪ Ω4 ∪
(
Ω2 ∩ {(x, y), y ≥ x− 1}
) ∪ (Ω5 ∩ {(x, y), y < 5/2− x}).
This means that in this example we are considering an external convective field in the
direction of −b(x) which is represented in Figure 6. The rest of the parameters and
boundary conditions are the same as in Example 5.
We note that the convective field b is not parallel to the boundary in Ω1∩{(x, y), x = 0},
where an outward flow is prescribed and in Ω6 ∩ {(x, y), x = 1.5}, where an inward flow is
prescribed. The adjoint problem to be solved in each subdomain Ωi, i = 1, . . . , 6, in this
14
Emissions Pollution Stock
Figure 6: Six countries in an L-shaped domain with convection.
particular problem is
∇ · (k∇vi)− b · ∇vi − cvi − ρvi = ϕi1Ωi , in Ω
∇vi · n− (b · n)vi = 0, on ΓN
∇vi · n+ (1− b · n)vi = 0, on ΓR
where ΓR = ∂Ω ∩ {(x, y), x = 0} and ΓN = ∂Ω\ΓR.
In Figure 6 we observe that there is a change in scale due to the size of the convective
field b. Qualitatively the effect of the convective flow is clear. The countries concentrate
their emissions near the boundary of the downstream neighbour. That is, the countries
profit from the fact that pollution is transported away with flow whereas the positive effect
of the emissions in the welfare remains in the country. The steady state of the stock of
pollution also presents some interesting and new characteristics. We can clearly see in the
right picture of Figure 6 that most part of the stock of pollution is concentrated downstream,
even if the size of emissions is similar in the six countries. Interestingly, we also observe
that near the boundary ΓR where the outward flow drains the pollution out of Ω the stock
of pollution is remarkably low due to the open boundary.
15
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies a transboundary pollution dynamic game that takes into account both
the temporal and the spatial dimension of the environmental-economic problem. The
spatial-temporal evolution of the stock of a pollutant is described by a diffusion partial
differential equation and general boundary conditions are assumed. The main difference
with respect to most of the recent literature that adds the spatial aspect in the study of
different economic and environmental problems is that instead of a single decision maker,
several decision makers and strategic interactions between them are considered. As far as
we know only these two papers De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, 2019b)) have intro-
duced the strategic interactions between the decision-makers. These papers follow a spatial
discretization approach to characterize the equilibrium emission strategies of transbound-
ary pollution dynamic games with spatial effects. In this paper we depart from the spatial
discretization approach and characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium emission strate-
gies of the J-player model formulated in continuous space and continuous time with two
spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension. For a linear-state specification of trans-
boundary pollution dynamic game inspired in Jørgensen & Zaccour (2001) and De Frutos
& Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019b) we can explicitly compute the players’ value functions and hence,
the feedback Nash equilibrium emission strategies. These strategies are constant in time
but remarkably they are space-dependent. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first in
the literature to characterize the optimal intraregional distribution of the emissions. The
present approach allows us, first, to determine the average total emission in each region (as
in De Frutos & Mart´ın-Herra´n (2019a, b) using the space-discretized model); and second,
the optimal spatial location of the emissions of each region. Our analytical results and
examples with different geographical configurations show that the spatial aspects play an
important role in the determination of the equilibrium emission strategies.
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